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Abstract In this paper I develop a version of contextualism that I call interests  
contextualism.  Interests contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of 
knowledge ascribing and denying sentences are partly determined by the ascriber’s 
interests and purposes.  It therefore stands in opposition to the usual view on which the 
truth-conditions are partly determined by the ascriber’s conversational context.  I give an 
argument against one particular implementation of the usual view, differentiate interests 
contextualism from other prominent versions of contextualism and argue that, unlike 
those versions, interests contextualism can mitigate against the epistemic descent 
objection put forward by Duncan Pritchard in his 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the 
Problem of Epistemic Descent' (the objection is that, on the contextualist view, an 
ascriber of knowledge cannot, for some subject S and proposition p, properly ascribe 
knowledge that p to S if that ascriber has previously retracted an earlier ascription of 
knowledge that p to S). 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I develop a version of epistemic contextualism (henceforth, contextualism) 
that I call interests contextualism.  Interests contextualism is the view that the truth-
conditions of ‘knowledge’ ascribing and denying sentences are partly determined by the 
ascriber’s interests and purposes.1  I argue that interests contextualism can, unlike other 
versions of contextualism in the literature, mitigate against Duncan Pritchard’s epistemic 
descent objection (see Pritchard, 2001). 
 
2. Contextualism and Relevance in a Context 
Contextualism is the view that utterances of sentences involving the word 'knows' 
express different propositions relative to different contexts of utterance.  Say that Dougal 
                                                          
1 In this paper I follow the practice of put quotation marks around ‘know’ and its 
cognates to indicate semantic ascent. 
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has the true belief that a certain bank is open on Saturdays.  The contextualist thinks that 
Ted can truthfully utter the sentence ‘Dougal knows that the bank is open on Saturdays’ 
in his context of utterance but Jack can truthfully utter the sentence ‘Dougal doesn’t 
know that the bank is open on Saturdays’ in his (different) context of utterance.   
 
Interests contextualism is a version of relevant alternatives contextualism (RAC):2 
 
Relevant alternatives contextualism (RAC): 'S knows that p' is true in A's context C iff S's 
evidence eliminates every alternative in which not-p that is relevant in C. 
 
But what makes an alternative relevant? Let’s say that Ted is in the following practical 
situation.  It’s Friday and he’s driving past the bank on his way home from lunch with 
Dougal and Jack when he remembers that he’s got a cheque that he can cash.  He looks 
out of the window and notices there’s a long queue.  He’s in no rush to cash the cheque 
so he could come back some other day.  He decides to drive on, saying to himself 
‘Dougal mentioned that he was in this bank last Saturday so he knows that it’s open then.  
I can come back tomorrow’.  Call this Low.  Jack is also driving past the same bank when 
he remembers that he’s got a big cheque that he has to cash by Saturday otherwise he’ll 
go bankrupt.  He also notices the long queue but he decides to go in, saying to himself 
‘Dougal said he was in this bank last Saturday, but banks do change their opening hours 
so he doesn’t know that’.  Call this High.3  We can distinguish two options open to the 
contextualist for determining relevance.  First, it could be that salience makes an 
alternative relevant.  In Low the alternative that the bank has changed its opening hours 
isn’t relevant because it isn’t even considered by Ted.  In High that alternative is relevant 
because Jack takes it seriously.  Call this the salience view.  Second, it could be that stakes 
make an alternative relevant.  In Low the alternative isn’t relevant because it isn’t 
important given Ted’s interests and purposes.  In High it is relevant because it is 
important given Jack’s interests and purposes.  Call this the stakes view.  In this section I 
give reasons for thinking that the salience view should be rejected.  An alternative that is 
salient in a context need not be relevant. 
 
                                                          
2 See Lewis, 1996 and Blome-Tillmann, 2009 for two other versions of RAC in the 
literature.  
3 I take this case from DeRose (see DeRose, 2009, Chapter 1). 
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Lewis, a defender of the salience view, provides the following rule governing what 
alternatives are relevant to an ascriber A of ‘knowledge’ that p to a subject S in context C: 
Rule of Attention: Any alternatives in which not-p that are being attended to by A in C are 
relevant in C (Lewis, 1996, p. 554).  
 
For Lewis, what does it mean to attend to an alternative? Some have read Lewis as 
holding that the mentioning of an alternative suffices for it to be attended to (Blome-
Tillmann, 2009, pp. 244-9).  That would mean that any alternatives mentioned to or by 
an ascriber of ‘knowledge’ in her conversational context are relevant in that context. 
In his 'Knowledge and Presuppositions' Michael Blome-Tillmann argues for rejecting the 
Rule of Attention by providing a case where our intuitions diverge from what the rule 
predicts.  A mother hears her teenage son slipping out of the house after midnight.  After 
spending the night fuming, in the morning she challenges him: 'I know you went out late 
last night, I heard you!' to which he responds 'how do you know? It's possible that you 
dreamt the whole thing'.  The son has mentioned an alternative on which it is not the 
case that he slipped out of the house.  Blome-Tillmann says: 'On Lewis's account you find 
yourself in a context in which you have to admit to your son that you do not 'know' that he sneaked 
away at night, and this surely is not just a pity, it is rather also mistaken" (op.cit. p. 246). 
 
This case is a good counter-example to Blome-Tillmann’s reading of the Rule of Attention.  
Unfortunately, Lewis doesn't really think that just mentioning an alternative suffices to 
make it relevant.  Let's say that, before her son gets up, the mother is discussing him with 
a friend.  Her friend mentions the alternative that she dreamt her son leaving the house 
but only in jest.  In such cases, says Lewis, "we might quickly strike a tacit agreement to speak 
just as if we were ignoring [an alternative]; and after just a little of that, doubtless [that alternative] 
really would be ignored" (Lewis, 1996, p. 560).  It isn't enough for the mother to be forced to 
admit that she doesn't ‘know’ that her son left the house that an alternative on which she 
was dreaming is mentioned.  If it is mentioned, as it is by her friend, and the 
conversational participants quickly strike an agreement to speak as if ignoring it, the 
alternative will be not be attended to.  In contrast, if her son mentions it and there is no 
agreement to speak as if ignoring it, as there presumably wouldn't be in a conversation 
between a mother and an awkward son, the possibility is, for Lewis, attended to.   
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But would we want to say that the mother, in a case where the son sticks to his guns and 
insists that she might have dreamt the whole thing, couldn’t truly claim to ‘know’ that her 
son left the house? I certainly don’t want to say that, and I’m sure not many people 
would.  I take it that our intuition is that if the mother were to say that she ‘knows’ then 
that would be true.  It’s a real black mark against any rule of relevance that it delivers 
such a counter-intuitive result.  So this counter-example gives us good reason to reject 
the Rule of Attention.  It shows that an alternative that is being attended to in a context (it 
has been mentioned and the conversational participants haven’t implicitly agreed to 
ignore it) can be irrelevant.  
 
3. Interests Contextualism 
I have argued that one prominent version of the salience view should be rejected.  In this 
section I develop a version of the stakes view.  Consider the Low case from earlier.  Ted 
is trying to decide whether to go to the bank on Friday or come back on Saturday and he 
has Dougal’s recollection as his evidence.  This evidence is clearly not sufficient to rule 
out all alternatives in which the bank isn’t open.  Banks can change their opening hours.  
But, even if that alternative is salient within Ted’s context (imagine that he has Tom in 
the car with him who repeatedly insists that banks can change their opening hours) it 
may not be that Ted should consider it.  On my view, an alternative that an ascriber 
shouldn’t consider in a context is irrelevant.  Compare this with Jack in High.  Jack is in 
the same practical situation as Ted except that, for him, a lot rides on whether the bank is 
open on Saturdays.  Even if the alternative that the bank has changed its opening hours 
isn't salient (imagine that, for whatever reason, Jack fails to consider it) it is relevant to 
Jack because he should consider it. 
 
What I’m proposing is replacing the Rule of Attention with what I call the Rule of Relevance: 
 
Rule of Relevance: If an ascriber should consider an alternative in which p in her context C 
then that alternative is relevant in C. 
 
It will be of use to introduce the term important practical question (taken from Stanley, 2005, 
pp. 92-6).  In Low Ted is in a low stakes situation.  Whether the bank is open on 
Saturdays isn’t, for Ted, an important practical question (nothing in particular rides on it).  
Compare this to Jack in High.  It is an important practical question for Jack (a lot rides on 
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it).  The interests contextualist says that an alternative in which p is relevant to A in her 
context C iff A has a reason to consider the alternative in which p in C, and that what A 
has a reason to consider depends upon what the important practical questions are for A 
in C.  In what follows I will clarify two points.4  First, what is it to have a reason to 
consider an alternative? Second, what about cases where an ascriber mistakenly takes 
herself to be in a high (or low) stakes practical situation when she is actually in a low (or 
high) stakes situation? 
 
Consider this case taken from Bernard Williams (Williams, 1980).  Bernard has a glass in 
front of him and he's trying to decide whether to drink from it.  He wants to drink from 
the glass if it contains gin, but he doesn't want to drink from it if it contains an 
unpleasant liquid such as petrol.  Let’s say that the glass in fact contains petrol but 
Bernard is completely unaware of this.  In fact, he believes that it contains gin.  As 
Williams argues, in such a situation we would want to say that Bernard hasn’t got a 
reason to drink from the glass.  Rather, he mistakenly thinks that he does (op.cit., pp. 78-
9).  Similarly, we would want to say that Bernard has got a reason to consider the 
possibility that the glass contains petrol but he mistakenly doesn’t think that he does.  
There isn't anything mysterious about these reasons.  Bernard's practical interests and 
purposes (his desire to drink from the glass if it contains gin but not if it contains an 
unpleasant liquid) are such that he shouldn’t drink from the glass and he should consider 
the alternative that the glass contains petrol.  It isn’t hard to make sense of reasons for 
agents to act in certain ways that exist in virtue of those agent’s motives and desires i.e. 
internal reasons. 
 
I understand what it is to have a reason to consider an alternative as follows: A has a 
reason to consider an alternative in which p in C iff A's practical interests and purposes 
in C are such that she should consider the alternative.  When I say interests and purposes 
I mean the agent’s actual interests and purposes.  If an agent mistakenly takes herself to 
be in a low stakes situation when she is actually in a high stakes situation, or vice versa, 
then that agent will have mistaken beliefs about what alternatives are relevant.  But, on 
my view, that doesn’t affect what alternatives are actually relevant. 
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Consider Ted and Jack’s respective situations in Low and High. Take the alternative that 
the bank has changed its opening hours (and, in particular, that it is no longer open on 
Saturdays).  Jack is an agent with certain practical interests and purposes.  He has an 
important bill to pay, the bill won't be paid unless the cheque is cashed by Saturday, and 
he wants to ensure that the bill is paid.  Given these facts about Jack, he has a reason to 
consider the alternative that the bank has changed its opening hours.  His practical 
interests and purposes are such that he should consider the alternative.  This is no more 
mysterious than the reason Bernard has to consider the alternative that the glass contains 
petrol in the case above.  Compare this to Ted.  He doesn't want to waste time standing 
in a queue when it isn't necessary, but otherwise it's all the same to him whether he goes 
to the bank on Friday, Saturday, or next week. Given these facts about Ted, Ted has no 
reason to consider the alternative.  His interests and purposes are such that he need not 
consider the alternative.  None of this would change if Jack were ignorant of his high 
stakes situation.  He would still have a reason to consider the possibility that the bank has 
changed its opening hours.  Similarly, if Ted were to take himself to be in a high stakes 
situation he would still lack a reason to consider that possibility.  
 
Finally, one might wonder what interests contextualism has to say about a number of 
other cases discussed in the literature.5  I’ll consider two sorts of cases here.  First, cases 
where an ascriber is in a low standards context and discussing what a subject in a high 
standards context ‘knows’.  Jason Stanley has argued that our intuitions about these sorts 
of Low Ascriber-High Subject cases are better handled by subject-sensitive invariantism than 
contextualism (Stanley, 2005, Chapter 6). Insofar as I defend a version of contextualism I 
hold that it is the ascriber’s context that matters to the determination of the truth-
conditions of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions.  I offer the following by way of response.  I’m not 
arguing here for the superiority of interests contextualism over subject-sensitive 
invariantism.  Doing that would require an in-depth consideration of what both views say 
about a wide range of cases.  I’m arguing that there are problems with one prominent 
version of what I have called the salience view and, in response, putting forward a 
version of the stakes view that I call interests contextualism.  
 
                                                          
5 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Philosophia for pressing me on the need to clarify 
both what I have to say about the range of cases that one can consider and what bearing 
these cases have on the argument I’m developing in this paper. 
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Second, what about an agent in Jack's situation in High who doesn't care that he's going 
to go bankrupt if he doesn't cash his cheque? For this agent to not have a reason to 
consider the alternative that the bank has changed its opening hours it would have to be 
that his interests and purposes are such that he need not consider it.  Again, when I say 
interests and purposes I mean the agent’s actual interests and purposes not what the 
agent believes his interests and purposes to be.  If an agent truly lacks any interest or 
purpose that would be furthered by considering a certain alternative then, on my view, 
that agent has no reason to consider that alternative.   
  
4. Interests Contextualism vs. Other Versions of Contextualism 
In this section I highlight the main respects in which interests contextualism differs from 
some other versions of contextualism defended in the literature and discuss an objection 
to my view. 
 
First, the differences.  Say that A asserts 'S knows that p'.  A's assertion is true in context 
C iff S's evidence eliminates every alternative in which not-p that is relevant in C.  For 
the interests contextualist, standing in a certain relation to an ascriber's interests in a 
given context is sufficient for an alternative in which not-p to be relevant in that context.  
Compare this to Lewis where what is being attended to within A’s context dictates which 
alternatives are relevant (Lewis, 1996, p. 559). Compare this to Keith DeRose where the 
course of the conversation within A's context dictates which alternatives are relevant 
(DeRose, 2009, Chapter 4). 
 
Blome-Tillmann has developed a version of contextualism that has a lot in common with 
interests contextualism (Blome-Tillmann, 2009).  Say that S has the true belief that p.  
Certain alternatives on which not-p will be relevant for an ascriber A.  In particular, for 
Blome-Tillmann, any alternative on which not-p that is compatible with what A 
pragmatically presupposes in C is relevant.  Pragmatically presupposing that q in a 
context means being disposed to engage in conversation on the assumption that all 
conversational participants take it as read that q.  So if all that A pragmatically 
presupposes in C is that q, and an alternative on which not-p is compatible with q, then 
that alternative is relevant in C (op.cit., pp. 249-55).  
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Consider how the case of the mother and the insistent son from §2 might end.  The 
mother, realising that her son is going to continue to insist that she might have dreamt 
him leaving the house, may put her foot down and claim ‘It doesn’t matter whether you 
insist that I might have dreamt it, I know that you left the house last night’.  But, on 
Blome-Tillmann’s view, it’s ‘unclear’ whether that assertion is true (op.cit., p. 267).6  As 
earlier, I take it that we have the intuition that the mother’s claim is clearly true.  Unlike 
Blome-Tillmann, the interests contextualist can easily accommodate this.  Given the 
mother’s interests and purposes, she hasn’t got a reason to consider the alternative that 
she dreamt her son leaving the house.  She can truthfully assert that she ‘knows’ that he 
left the house. 
 
I will now consider an objection to my view.7  In any conversation the participants will 
have their own epistemic standards.  On DeRose’s view, which he defends in Chapter 4 
of his recent The Case for Contextualism, in a conversation between two conversational 
participants A and B where what he calls the personally indicated content of A and B 
differ, an ascription or denial of ‘knowledge’ to S is true/false iff S meets/fails to meet 
the standards set by the personally indicated content of both A and B, and truth-valueless 
iff S meets/fails to meet one set of standards but not the other (DeRose, 2009, pp. 144-
5).  What I have said above involves a denial of this view.  On my view, it looks as if 
there can be one conversation with two separate standards.  In response, I will argue that 
there are two objections to DeRose’s view.8   
 
First, DeRose’s view has the consequence that, in conversational contexts in which the 
‘knowledge’ ascriptions and denials of A and B differ in personally indicated content, if A 
ascribes or denies ‘knowledge’ that p to S then that ascription or denial has an 
indeterminate semantic content.  As above, for DeRose, in such contexts ‘knowledge’ 
ascriptions or denials are truth-valueless.  But the contextualist holds that the standards 
operative in a context play a role in determining the truth-values of ‘knowledge’ 
ascriptions by playing a role in determining the semantic content of those ascriptions.   If 
                                                          
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Philosophia for pointing out that Blome-Tillmann 
holds that the truth-value of an assertion in these sorts of contexts is unclear rather than, 
as I had claimed in an earlier version of this paper, false. 
7 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Philosophia for pressing this objection.   
8 I discuss both objections in a review of DeRose’s The Case for Contextualism that’s 
forthcoming in the Philosophical Review, co-authored with Duncan Pritchard.  In this paper 
I expand upon both objections. 
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a certain ‘knowledge’ ascription or denial is truth-valueless then, for the contextualist, 
that must be because it has an indeterminate semantic content.   
 
Second, on DeRose’s view the standard contextualist response to certain skeptical 
problems isn’t available.  Let’s say that Jim has just woken from an unusually vivid dream 
in which he loses his hands in an accident.  Startled, he lifts his right arm, sees his hand, 
and affirms ‘I know that I have a hand, that was just a dream’.  Later, a committed 
skeptic is informed of Jim’s utterance to which he response ‘Rubbish! Jim knows no such 
thing’.  I take it that the standard contextualist response would be to say that both Jim 
and the skeptic spoke truly, and, if Jim were to have a similar nightmare in the future 
and, upon waking, affirm ‘I know that I have hands’ then that assertion would be true as 
well.  But, on DeRose’s gap view, the contextualist can’t say this.  DeRose discusses the 
following sort of case (op.cit., pp. 148-50).  Say that in a low standards context Ted 
asserts that Dougal ‘knows’ that the bank is open on Saturdays. Later, Jack, who is in a 
high standards context and was told about Ted’s earlier assertion, says ‘Rubbish, Dougal 
knows no such thing!” DeRose says that Jack’s assertion is truth-valueless iff Dougal 
meets Ted’s standards but doesn’t meet Jack’s standards (op.cit., pp. 149-50).  That’s 
exactly what’s happening, so Jack’s assertion is truth-valueless.  That, of course, doesn’t 
change the fact that Ted’s assertion was true, or that what he asserted is still true in Jack’s 
high standards context.  Now consider what happens when, later, Ted, still in a low 
standards context, reminds himself that Dougal ‘knows’ that the bank is open on 
Saturdays and asserts this. Presumably, on DeRose’s view this assertion is truth-valueless 
iff Dougal meets Ted’s standards but not Jack’s.  That’s exactly what’s happening, so 
Ted’s assertion is truth-valueless.  Ted’s earlier assertion was true, and still is true, but this 
later one isn’t.  This case is structurally identical with the skeptical one above, so in that 
case DeRose would presumably have to say that, while Jim’s original assertion of ‘I know 
that I have hands’ was true, any later assertion of that same sentence would be truth-
valueless.  So the standard contextualist response to this sort of skeptical problem isn’t 
available to DeRose.   
 
Taken together, I take these two objections to be prima facie compelling objections to 
DeRose’s gap view and so to justify my denial of that view.  In the final section I argue 
that interests contextualism, unlike some prominent competitors, can mitigate against the 
epistemic descent objection. 
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5. Epistemic Ascent and Descent 
Say that Ted and Dougal are waiting for a flight to Toronto.  They want to find out 
whether it has a stopover in Heathrow.  Larry overhears the conversation and tells them 
that the flight itinerary says that it does.  Ted asserts 'Larry knows that the flight has a 
stopover.'  Call this context Low.  Suppose that Dougal says 'hold on, we really have to 
meet Jack there, maybe the itinerary is inaccurate.'  This, on some versions of 
contextualism, will lead to an upward shift in epistemic standards.  Following Duncan 
Pritchard, call an upward shift in epistemic standards epistemic ascent and a downward shift 
epistemic descent (Pritchard, 2001).  In response, Ted says 'You're right.  Larry doesn't know 
that the flight has a stopover.'  Call this context High.  On all of Blome-Tillmann, 
DeRose and Lewis' versions of contextualism Ted's assertions in Low and High are both 
true.   
 
A contextualist such as Lewis can explain an upward shift in epistemic standards, as 
apparently happens between Low and High.  An alternative on which the itinerary is 
inaccurate isn’t salient in Low but is made salient in High and, as a result, the standards 
shift upwards.  It’s rather unclear how a downward shift in epistemic standards occurs.  
DeRose suggests that once ‘the conversational air has cleared’ the standards will revert 
once more to the standards governing quotidian contexts (DeRose, 1995, p. 42). An 
explanation of how epistemic descent occurs would explain how, in a context, some time 
after Low and High, in which Ted and Dougal are no longer in a high stakes situation, 
Ted could truthfully re-ascribe ‘knowledge’ to Larry.  Pritchard's objection is that even if 
the contextualist could provide an explanation of epistemic descent such that Ted could 
truthfully assert Larry ‘knows’ that doesn't mean that Ted could properly assert that Larry 
doesn't ‘know’ (Pritchard, 2001, pp. 336-41).9  Pritchard generates this objection by 
appealing to what one conversationally implicates in ascribing knowledge to a subject.  If 
I assert 'S knows that p' I imply, amongst other things, that S is an authority on the 
matter of p.  If, later, I reverse my assertion and say ‘S doesn’t know that p’ I imply, 
amongst other things, that S isn’t actually an authority on the matter of p.  So consider 
the implicatures generated by Ted's various assertions.  In Low Ted implies that Larry is 
                                                          
9 This gives us another way of stating the second objection to DeRose’s gap-view in the 
previous section.  The argument I developed shows that, on DeRose’s gap view, 
epistemic descent isn’t even possible.  I will not pursue this given that Pritchard’s 
objection is targeted at contextualism generally, as opposed to DeRose’s version of it. 
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an authority on the matter of whether the flight has a stopover.  In High Ted reverses this 
implicature and implies that Larry is actually no authority on this matter.  If Ted were to 
later assert that Larry knows he would imply that Larry is an authority on the same 
matter after all.  At this point, the mess of contradictory implicatures generated by Ted's 
various assertions leaves him unable to properly assert that Larry knows. 
 
As Pritchard notes, this isn't meant to be a decisive objection against contextualism 
(op.cit., p. 341).  There are two avenues of escape.  First, the contextualist could accept 
that Ted couldn't properly assert that Larry ‘knows’.  Second, the contextualist could 
deny that Ted couldn't properly assert that Larry ‘knows’.  Taking the first option would 
mean accepting that once an ascriber has reversed an ascription of ‘knowledge’ to a 
subject based upon certain evidence then that ascriber could not then properly re-ascribe 
‘knowledge’ to that subject based on that evidence.  But consider what the contextualist 
wants to say about cases like Low and High.  The contextualist idea is that in some 
contexts the epistemic standards are relatively low and so a large number of ‘knowledge’ 
ascriptions are true whereas in other contexts the standards are a good deal higher and so 
a large number of, if not all, ‘knowledge’ ascriptions are false.  To take the first option is 
to hold that once the standards have got high they can’t then return to being low.  Taking 
the second option would mean accepting that even though Ted is generating 
contradictory implicatures that is no obstacle to him making a proper assertion.10  
 
Here’s what the interests contextualist can say in response.  Pritchard exploits a volatile 
contextualist depiction of our epistemic discourse in which a shift in standards can occur 
at any time in any conversational context.  This isn't the way that the interests 
contextualist depicts our epistemic discourse.  For the interests contextualist, but not on 
the versions of contextualism defended by Blome-Tillmann, DeRose and Lewis, there is 
no shift in Ted's epistemic standards between Low and High.  The possibility that the 
itinerary is inaccurate is one that Ted has a reason to consider in both Low and High: 
given his practical interest in meeting Jack, he should consider it.  So Ted's assertion in 
Low is false and his assertion in High is true.  Of course, our practical interests do change 
over time.  Just because a given possibility isn't one that we have reason to consider in 
one context doesn't mean it isn't one we have reason to consider in another context.   
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objection. 
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Consider a modified airport scenario: 
 
Low*: Ted and Dougal are waiting for a flight to Toronto and idly wondering how long it 
will take.  They want to find out whether it has a stopover in Heathrow.  Larry overhears 
the conversation and tells them that the flight itinerary says that it does.  Ted asserts 
'Larry knows that the flight has a stopover.'  
 
High*: On another occasion, Ted and Dougal are waiting for a flight to Toronto.  They 
need to stopover in Heathrow because it is imperative that they meet Jack there.  Larry 
overhears the conversation and tells them that the flight itinerary says it does.  Ted 
asserts 'Larry doesn't know that the flight has a stopover.' 
 
We have specified that there is a change in Ted's practical interests between Low* and 
High*.  Say that, on some future occasion, Ted and Dougal are waiting for a flight to 
Toronto and idly wondering how long it will take.  Larry has again seen the itinerary and 
tells them that it is a stopover in Heathrow.  It looks like Ted can’t properly assert that 
Larry ‘knows’ because doing so would generate a mess of contradictory implicatures.  
The two options above remain.  Should the interests contextualist accept that Ted cannot 
properly assert that Larry ‘knows’ or deny that Ted cannot properly assert that Larry 
‘knows’?   
 
Here's what I think the interests contextualist should say.  The first point is that the 
interests contextualist has reduced the damage.  Both options are non-starters if 
epistemic ascent and descent can happen at any time in any conversational context in the 
way that contextualists like Lewis predict.  Let's imagine Ted is a frequent flyer and on 
some occasions he ascribes ‘knowledge’ that flights have stopovers to various subjects 
based upon them having seen the itinerary whereas on other occasions he denies subjects 
‘knowledge’ where those subjects have the same evidence.  If, as in the case of Ted the 
frequent flyer, an ascriber's interests are such that they regularly assert that some subject 
‘knows’ that proposition p in some contexts and doesn't ‘know’ that p in other contexts 
(without there being any difference in that subject's epistemic position with respect to p 
between these contexts) then she cannot properly assert that that subject ‘knows’ that p.  
But I would argue that most people don't have interests and purposes that are like Ted's.  
13 
So the strategy I would urge in response to Pritchard's objection is to say that, in certain 
cases, such as Ted the frequent flyer, the interests contextualist should accept that an 
ascriber cannot properly make a ‘knowledge’ ascription that he regularly reverses.  To do 
so would be to generate a mess of contradictory implicatures.  The important point is 
that these will be isolated cases.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that what I call interests contextualism can at least mitigate 
against the force of the epistemic descent objection, unlike other prominent versions of 
contextualism in the literature.  These other versions are views on which it is salience that 
determines the relevance of alternatives in a context.  Because the interests contextualist 
thinks that stakes determine what alternatives are relevant in a context she doesn’t hold 
that our epistemic discourse is volatile.11   
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